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In recent years, the use of stock options as an incentive compensation scheme has evolved to
be one of the most debated topics in the finance literature as well as in the corporate world.
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bankers and other top executives during the current financial crisis, heated up this debate
even more. Our study contributes to the empirical research on stock option plans (SOPs) by
focusing on start-up or ’new economy’ firms in Germany. For the 329 firms that went public
at the ‘Neuer Markt’, a special stock market segment for young growth companies in
Germany, we find a high popularity of stock options in that more than 90% of all IPOs
implemented at least one stock option plan (SOP) at the time of the IPO or later on. These
SOPs were broad-based and included rank and file employees as the options’ recipients. Our
empirical results reveal - at least with hindsight - that accepting stock options as part of an
overall salary package did not pay off financially for employees during that time period.
Furthermore, the success and performance of the investigated SOPs were influenced by their
statutory design and the succession of three different lock-up periods. These made a
profitable option exercise for employees very difficult. Our findings question the rationale
behind the design, introduction and implementation of SOPs during the time of the ‘Neuer
Markt’ in Germany at least fi'om the perspective of non-executive employees.
I. Introduction
In recent years, the practice of granting stock options to executives and board
members as part of performance-based incentive compensation has become one of the most
debated topics in the finance literature and in the corporate world (Hall and Murphy, 2003;
Murphy, 2003). At the center of these studies and investigations are often the potential
conflicts of interest that exist between the different stakeholder groups such as shareholders
and management. The empirical evidence so far suggests that stock options were not only
issued at times when stock prices were temporarily depressed but in many cases also
backdated so that the exercise price coincided with the lowest stock price (Yermark, 1997; Lie
2005; Heron and Lie, 2007). Obviously, such a strategy maximizes the benefits for the
recipient. More recently, the granting of stock options to “rank and file employees” have
gained importance as part of overall compensation plans (Mehran and Tracy, 2001; Oyer and
Schaefer, 2005). In contrast to the compensation of executives, the offering of stock options to
employees is often motivated by a different reasoning. Especially for start-up firms, the
rationale is to attract qualified employees at initially low expenses. These schemes offer the
employees the opportunity of high returns if the venture is successfiil but also exposes them to
extreme risks. Whether such a strategy is successfiil for management and shareholders and
also beneficial for its employees is an empirical question that is addressed in this study.
The objective of this research is to analyze the design and success of stock option plans
(SOPs) for start-up firms that went public at the ‘Neuer Markt’ - the stock market segment for
growth companies in Germany - during the period from 1997 to 2002. Our research reveals
that SOPs were frequently used as a compensation scheme at new economy firms. Of the 329
IPOs at the ‘Neuer Markt’, 72% granted stock options at the time of the IPO and an additional
19% implemented an SOP later on. Interestingly, we observe a broad-based granting practice
of stock options to the rank and file employees rather than to executives as the only
beneficiaries in our sample. This observation is in contrast to the usual practice at large
established firms and requires different explanations than the ones usually applied.
The standard managerial incentive versus windfall profit debate considers executives as the
sole recipients of these options. In line with some previous research (Bergman and Jenter,
2007) our empirical results suggest that the employee's prediction of the up-side potential of
stock prices and the option value was too optimistic at the time the option plans were
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initiated. In fact, the ‘Neuer Markt’ was characterized by an immense stock price increase
during the 1998-2000 hot issue market period which was then followed by a sharp stock
price decline and cold issue market period that started in March 2000. The acceptance of
stock options appeared to be very attractive during the hot issue market period, but they were
mostly out of the money at the time they could be exercised (Bessler, Becker and Wagner,
2007). This is remarkable given the fact that the options’ exercise price was often set equal to
the issuing price and that the IPOs at the ‘Neuer Markt’ were in general tremendously
underpriced. The first-day or initial return for the 329 IPOs was on average 48.9% (Kurth,
2005; Bessler and Kurth, 2007). Despite these substantial initial returns our empirical
findings question the merits of such a compensation scheme for employees.
When interpreting these empirical findings it is important to analyze them in the context of
the German regulatory environment. First of all, the legal environment during the time period
of the ’Neuer Markt’ required a lock-up period of at least two years for stock options issued
by German firms (Bessler, Becker and Wagner, 2007). Moreover, there were two additional
lock-up requirements that usually expired before the end of the two year lock-up period for
stock options. The first lock-up period of six months was mandated by the rules and
regulations of the ‘Neuer Markt’ and applied to the founding shareholders and early investors
of the IPO who owned shares already before the IPO. The second one was a tax lock-up
period of twelve months that applied especially to private, wealthy investors that often had
privileged access to the investment bank and to IPO allocations. As documented in Bessler
and Kurth (2005, 2006 and 2007) these two lock-up periods created severe agency problems.
In fact, their studies provide empirical evidence of significant increases in trading volume as
well as significantly negative stock price reactions around the expiration of each of these two
lock-up periods. After controlling for these effects as well as for other factors, we find
evidence that most of these stock options were out of the money at the time they could be
exercised. Most importantly, however, the performance of firms with and without SOPs is
quite different and highly sensitive to the expiration of the other lock-up periods. These
results may question the rationale behind the acceptance of stock option compensation by
employees in general but in particular in this unique environment. In fact, our results provide
evidence of severe agency problems when two other stakeholder groups have the opportunity
to exit earlier fi*om their investment than the rank-and-file employees that had to keep their
stock option for at least two years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide insights into the
regulatory and institutional environment which applied to the issuance of stock options during
this ‘new economy’ and the ’Neuer Markt’ period. The literature is reviewed in section III and
the data and methodology are described in section IV. In section V we present and discuss our
empirical findings while section VI concludes.
II. The Regulatory and Institutional Environment in Germany
1. ‘N euerM arkt'
Historically, the German capital market was relatively small given the size of the German
economy. Moreover, it did not offer great opportunities for start-up firms to go public and to
raise new equity. Over the period from 1983 to 1997, the annual number of new listings was
only between 9 and 33 per year (Bessler and Thies, 2007a). With the bull market and the ‘new
economy’ boom in the late 1990s, IPOs suddenly became increasingly popular and an
attractive financing source for start-up and high technology firms. One important event that
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attracted public attention in Germany was the widely promoted IPO of the formerly state
owned Deutsche Telekom, the German telecommunication services provider, which occurred
just before the opening of the ‘Neuer Markt’ in 1997. The ‘Neuer Markt’ was created as a
special stock market segment for start-up technology firms at the German Stock Exchange
(Deutsche Borse). It was closed in 2003 due to some fraud cases but most importantly
because of some regulatory problems. Since then, most companies are listed on other stock
market segments.
The ‘Neuer Markt’ rules and regulation included specific requirements that were
intended to help signal the quality of the IPOs at this new stock market segment. These rules
were different from those applying to large and established firms trading in other market
segments. First, firms were required to raise additional equity at the time of the IPO by
issuing new shares. At least half of the issued shares had to be primary shares whereas the
other half could be secondary shares. Second, IPOs were required to invest the money raised
through the IPO into growth opportunities and innovation. They were not allowed to use the
proceeds for repaying debt. Third, firms were not permitted to issue additional shares
(seasoned equity offering) during the first six months after going public. In addition, existing
shareholders had to commit to a mandatory lock-up period of at least six months (Bessler and
Kurth, 2007). Although these rules and regulations seemed attractive at a first glance and
adequate for reducing potential conflicts of interest, they created a variety of new agency
problems (Kurth 2005; Bessler and Kurth 2007). Another interesting and important aspect that
has been omitted in most studies was related to the German tax code. It imposed a capital
gains tax only on profits from security trades that occurred within a holding period of less
than 12 months (Bessler and Kurth, 2006). This made tax avoidance strategies quite attractive
and economically profitable.
2. Stock Option Plans
In Germany the granting of stock options (SOP) has to be approved at the annual shareholder
meeting (ASM), because the most common way to issue options is a contingent seasoned
equity offering that requires ‘authorized capital’. Before the approval detailed information
about the SOP has to be made publicly available in a newspaper authorized by the stock
exchange (e.g., Bundesanzeiger) 30 days before the ASM. At least some information about
SOPs also has to be included in the companies’ annual reports. Additional disclosures were
not required. This situation changed with the introduction of the German Corporate
Governance Codex (GCGC) on February 26, 2002. The GCGC requires an extensive
disclosure of SOPs on the companies’ website and a detailed explanation in the companies’
annual reports. Furthermore, stock options have to be disclosed in the equity section of the
annual report. Moreover, the Companies Act (Aktiengesetz) and the Corporate Sector
Supervision and Transparency Act (KonTraG)^ limit the size and the group of persons eligible
for stock options plans. During the time of our empirical study (1997-2002), stock options
could be legally granted to a wide range of persons including members of the supervisory
board. After the approval of the stock option plan by the ASM the final decision about the
^ Regierungskomission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex [ed] (2005), p. 7.
^ Became effective on May 1, 1998 and changed among other things the Companies Act (§192, Sec. 2, No .3) by
introducing a lock-up period of at least two years (Bundesgesetzblatt, April 30, 1998, p .788.)
^ This practice was ruled out by the Federal Court of Justice, the highest appellate court in Germany for civil and
criminal cases, on February 16, 2004. The quoted reason for this decision given by the court was that SOPs
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option recipients was delegated to management."^ The German Companies Act limits the
volume of authorized capital for SOPs of German public listed companies to 10% of the
subscribed capital. Thus, the maximum volume of a SOP is restricted (AktG §192).
Finally, accounting rules determine the way stock options are reported in financial statements
and annual reports.^ IPOs at the ‘Neuer Markt’ were required to use either US-GAAP or IAS
accounting rules.^ According to US-GAAP two different valuation and accounting approaches
were feasible for SOPs. Following the Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25 (APB
25), fixed SOPs (number of shares and exercise price are known in advance) are valued at the
grant date at their intrinsic value. If the exercise price is higher or equal to the market price at
the grant date, then the options’ intrinsic value is zero. An alternative approach was
subsequently introduced by the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (SFAS
123). This method determines the value of the option by applying a valuation model (e.g.,
Black-Scholes). The option value is then expensed over the period until the option is
exercised. An exception applies if the grant date is before the measurement date. This is the
date when the number and exercise price of the option are known. In this case, an intrinsic
value approach is applied which then has to be restated every year.^ Setting an exercise price
equal or higher than the market price and applying APB 25 offered the opportunity of keeping
the personnel costs induced by stock options off the financial statement. SFAS 123 offered at
least a delay in reporting of these costs if the options’ intrinsic value was initially zero.

III. Review of the Literature
For our analysis of stock option plans the theories and empirical findings from various
research areas are relevant. In the first section we therefore discuss the literature with respect
to the incentive structure for executive SOPs and then focus in the second section on the
literature of broad-based SOPs for ‘new economy’ firms.
1. Executive Stock Options: Managerial Incentive or Windfall Profit?
One reason often given for performance-based compensation in the form of stock options is
the reduction of potential agency problems between managers and shareholders which stem
fi-om the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Most often
employee stock options are consequently granted to upper level employees as part of their
compensation packages. The basic idea is that stock options should align the interests of
managers and shareholders and should motivate executives to maximize shareholder value by
creating a direct link between firm performance and executive compensation (Hall and
Murphy, 2002). Moreover, accepting options instead of cash forces the manager to put his pay
at risk. Arya and Mittendorf (2005), for example, find that firms employ SOPs to mitigate
asymmetric information with respect to the managers’ skills and abilities. Duncan (2001)
could be influenced by the management within and beyond the law (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
16.03.2004, p. 11). This legal case was pushed further by the German shareholder rights organisations SdK
(Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V.) and DSW (Deutsche Schutzvereinigung fur Wertpapierbesitz
e.V.).
^ With the exception that grants to the executive board itself have to be decided by the supervisory board.
^ A comprehensive overview of accounting rules is provided by Dietz (2004), pp. 135-170.
^ These regulations of the Deutsche Borse required that companies listed at the “Neuer Markt” had to follow in
their accounting practices US-GAAP, IAS or German GAAP with a later transition to US-GAAP (Regelwerk
Neuer Markt).
^ Dietz (2004), p. 141-150.
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suggests that one of the most effective ways to energize employees and managers is to ’make
everyone an owner’ of the enterprise.^ Thus, the use of stock options may help firms to attract
talented managers and staff members who are able to select and implement profitable
investment projects more efficiently (Lazear, 2004). Moreover, stock options help a firm to
sort and screen for high quality and performance oriented employees and to retain them by
making compensation stagger with labor market conditions (Oyer and Schaefer, 2005).
In contrast to the potential positive effects of SOPs, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) view
the design of executive compensation schemes as part of the agency problem itself According
to their ’managerial power’ approach to executive compensation they argue that boards of
publicly traded companies cannot be expected to negotiate at arms’ length with managers. As
a result of this imbalance, managers can substantially influence their own pay arrangements.
Consequently, they are in a position to affect the size of their compensation packages and
reduce the extent to which their payments are decoupled from their performance. Yermack
(1997), Lie (2005), Sundaram, Brenner and Yermack (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007)
provide evidence that stock options are frequently issued at times when stock prices are low
and the upside potential for the beneficiaries is high. When looking at the timing and
backdating of stock options which have been the focus of some recent investigations, the
obvious shortcomings of these profit arrangements become quite obvious. Heron and Lie
(2007), for example, find that 13.6% of all option grants in the US between 1996 and 2005
have been backdated or manipulated in one way or another. These results are supported by
Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2007), who identify about 1,150 ’lucky’ option grants (grants
given at the lowest stock price of the month) to CEOs. Investigations by the Wall Street
Journal revealed that at the end of July 2007, 140 US firms were under Federal scrutiny for
past option grants (Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2007). Collins, Gong and Li (2009) blame
weak corporate governance structures as the main factor for the occurrence of backdating
executive stock options. Moreover, the tendency to backdate is more pronoimced when stock
options are an important part of CEO compensation and when directors receive option grants
on the same day as the CEO.
In addition, stock option may influence management behavior. One important aspect
in corporate strategy is to choose an appropriate level of risk which managers and the
company is willing to accept. The introduction of SOPs obviously will influence management
behavior and the risk exposure of the firm. Thus, SOPs may have either a positive or a
negative effect. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) investigate this interaction between executive
compensation and risk-taking and find that large stock and option holdings by managers
induce them to select variance-increasing investments. In support of this view, DeFusco,
Johnson and Zom (1990) report that implied volatility as well as stock-retum variances
increase after the approval of executive SOPs. Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) also find
evidence that the structure of executive compensation and stock option-based wealth induce
managerial risk-taking. Their results favor a management risk-taking hypothesis over a
managerial risk-aversion hypothesis. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) provide empirical
Arguments for this thesis are that ownership adds the promise of extraordinary personal wealth creation to
otherwise modest compensation programs. “Boring” compensation programs are complemented by an element
of excitement and personal ownership makes it attractive for talented and mobile employees to stay with the
company rather than bouncing from one job to another for higher base pay. Furthermore, ownership, particularly
in case of incentive stock option programs, is an economically attractive way of rewarding employees for high
performance (Duncan, 2001).
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evidence that managerial compensation schemes with higher sensitivity to stock price
volatility offer executives the incentive to both invest in riskier assets such as higher R&D
spending as well as lower capital expenditures and to implement a more aggressive debt
poHcy such as increasing leverage. In contrast, SOPs might have portfolio effects for
managers as their human and financial capital is highly concentrated in one company, leading
to a potential reduction in the chosen risk level of strategies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Murphy (2002) finds that there is no significant relationship between the salary and
bonus payments to a CEO and the industry-adjusted performance of the firm. The impact of
managerial luck versus skill is documented by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). They find
that cash compensation usually increases when a firm’s profits rise, even when these are
independent of the manager’s efforts. These shortcomings are based on the fact that the design
of SOPs often fails to account for industry- and market- wide increases in stock prices which
are unrelated to the performance of the manager. Thus, conventional stock options fail first to
correctly measure the outperformance that is directly attributable to the manager and second
to reward him for his success appropriately (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Under optimal
contract design, compensation that is due to windfall profits but not due to superior
performance is therefore difficult to explain without referring to agency problems. Because of
these possible shortfalls, different SOP structures were designed in order to reduce
unwarranted windfall profits. One approach is to link the exercise price of the option to a
market, industry or peer-group index (Rappaport, 1999). Another strategy is to condition the
“vesting” of options on specific performance targets. These targets can be either linked to the
stock price, to earnings per share, or to any other measure of firm performance (NCEO,
2002).
Another conflict of interest is apparent when managers use their position to influence
financial reporting or to structure transactions altering financial reports (Healy and Wahlen,
1999). The objective is to either mislead some stakeholders about the firm performance or to
influence contractual outcomes that are related to accounting figures (options or bonuses).
Bums and Kedia (2006) find significant evidence that CEO compensation packages affect the
adoption of aggressive accounting practices that often result in a restatement of announced
accounting figures. In particular, CEOs with option portfolios that are more sensitive to the
stock price are significantly more likely to misreport. To solve this aberration they claim that
long-term incentive plans which make CEO compensation a function of longer-term firm
value reduce the incentives of CEOs to misreport in order to boost short-term stock prices.
Additional problems of incentive compensation is highlighted in a study by Denis, Hanouna
and Sarin (2006) who find that the likelihood of a company being the target of fraud
allegations is positively related to the use of stock options. The main reason for this is the
fi*audulent manipulation of the companies’ stock price. Yermack (1997) discovers positive
abnormal stock returns after option grants and suggests that managers time the option grant
prior to the release of good news. Aboody and Kaznik (2000) support this view that managers
time the disclosure of information around fixed option grant dates. In fact, firms delay the
disclosure of positive news and accelerate the release of bad news prior to stock option award
periods. Focusing on a sample of IPO firms, Lowry and Murphy (2007) expect that if
executives can influence the timing and terms of their stock options or the issuing price, there
should be a positive relation between these ’IPO options’ and the observable IPO
underpricing. However, they do not find empirical support for this hypothesis. Kahle (2002)
reports that firms expecting a favorable stock price reaction announce share repurchases when
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executives have large numbers of options outstanding and when employees have large
numbers of options currently exercisable. Therefore, management attempts to maximize its
own wealth by using open market share repurchases to increase share prices. Although this
strategy usually is effective for established companies, it was not successful for IPOs at the
‘Neuer Markt’ in Germany (Bessler, Drobetz and Seim, 2009).
2.
New Technology Firms and Broad-based SOPs
Broad-based stock option plans have long been viewed as a vital mechanism through which
technology-intensive startup companies with high intellectual capital can attract and retain the
most talented employees (Jones, Kalmi and Makinen, 2006). Many argue that without such
plans, young entrepreneurial firms would be severely hampered in their ability to create new
technologies, products and wealth (Heesen, 2003). Dee, Lulseged and Nowlin (2005) examine
SOPs at US internet firms and find that these firms are generally characterized by a high level
of intangible assets, high growth opportunities, high volatility and a high level of innovation.
Due to pronounced information asymmetries between management and shareholders they
identify severe agency problems, which need to be properly addressed. One solution is to
introduce performance-based compensation packages, which aim at motivating the CEOs to
select projects which are consistent with the maximization of overall shareholder value. For a
sample of 279 US internet firms, they found that pay performance sensitivity is positively
related to risk.
Another important aspect is the granting practice. Oyer and Schaefer (2005) find that
the use of stock option grants in compensation plans especially for middle- and lower-level
employees has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Even after receiving a
compensation for risk, performance oriented employees might be willing to accept a reduction
in cash compensation when they receive attractive stock options as compensation. However,
when examining 1,000 randomly selected publicly traded companies in the US, they cannot
provide evidence for their initial h)^othesis that broad-based SOPs are introduced because of
incentive or retention reasons. In a study for Finland, Jones, Kalmi and Makinen (2006) find
that the stock option boom coincided with the bull market of the late 1990s. They discovered
that during the 1998 to 2000 period, broad-based stock options became very popular,
especially for newly listed firms. After the stock market downturn the number of broad-based
option schemes declined sharply. Very interestingly, they report that typically larger firms
with dispersed ownership adopted selective plans, while small ’new economy’ firms adopted
broad-based plans. Thus, it appears that broad-based SOPs are observed when the firm output
is human capital-intensive and the performance of employees is difficult to monitor. Selective
SOPs are implemented when ownership is dispersed and the incentives for shareholders to
monitor management are weak.
Callaghan, Stanford and Subramaniam (2006) examined whether there was a
difference in the performance of firms that granted options to executives and to non-executive
employees. They discovered that one dollar of options granted to top executives leads to
future operating income (cash flow) of $2.58 ($2.36). In contrast, future operating income
(cash flow) is only $0.40 ($1.15) for one dollar option value granted to non-executive
employees. This suggests that broad-based option compensation plans result, on average, in a
negative or no payoff to shareholders. At the same time, employees also do not profit. An
additional problem of accepting option grants from the perspective of the employees is that
the options’ real value is overestimated by executives as well as by rank and file employees.
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Bergman and Jenter (2007) argue that when employees are excessively optimistic about the
company’s value they are willing to overpay for options because rational option valuation is
difficult and beyond their abilities. Instead of applying objective valuation techniques, these
employees are likely to rely on heuristics and value options on the basis of their own or their
peers’ past experience with option payoffs. Furthermore, they discover that managers use
option compensation for rank and file employees more aggressively when managers believe
that their company’s stock is overvalued. In a survey of stock options in the US, Lambert and
Larcker (2001) find that middle-level employees assigned values to stock options that
exceeded the Black-Scholes (1979) value by 50% to 200%. Thus, the stock option holder’s
expectations about the stock price distribution are different from that of the market. This is
consistent with either systematically favorable private information or biased beliefs of the
option holder.^ If it is true that most option holders do not fully understand the underlying
price distribution, they may also not correctly understand the incentives provided by an
option.
Another aspect is that stock options could be used by the company as a means of
reducing personnel expenses to the disadvantage of the employees. Start-up firms typically
lack positive net income and need funds to finance growth opportunities. Because under some
circumstances options bear no accounting charge^ ^ and incur no direct cash outflow, Murphy
(2002 and 2003) suggests that firms perceive the costs of option compensation as
comparatively low and thus prefer options to cash compensation. In fact, paying employees
through granting options means that companies are effectively borrowing from their
employees. They receive employment services today in return for a contingent claim on
shares in the firm (Hall and Murphy, 2003). Thus, employee option compensation can be
beneficial especially for young growth companies because it lowers a firm’s cash outflows at
times when the firm is only marginally profitable and in which the owners need cash to
implement strategic decisions (Inderst and Muller, 2004). In contrast, Ittner, Lambert and
Larcker (2003) find no evidence that ’new economy’ firms facing cash restrictions grant more
options. Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) show that broad-based option plans are oftentimes related
to the location of the particular company headquarter. They find that broad-based option
grants are higher when the firm’s stock price co-moves with stock prices of other firms
located in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and when firms in their respective
MSAs have enjoyed abnormally high stock returns in the past.
rV. Data and Methodology
1. Data
^ If the recipient of stock options can affect firm value through his investment decision, then the value he places
on those options depends on his actions, meaning that the incentives and value provided by stock options also
depends on the characteristics of the individual holding the options (Nohel and Todd, 2005).
See also Meulbroek (2001), Hall and Murphy (2002), Drobetz, Pensa and Schmid (2007) and Hallock and
Olson (2006). Benartzi (2001) shows that employees in the US invest a large fraction of their 401 (k) assets in
their own firms’ stock, which seems to be a suboptimal portfolio choice given their large human capital
investment in the firm. An assumption or implication of these studies is that individuals do not understand the
expected distribution of stock prices.
This fact changed with the introduction of new regulations by the FASB and the lASB which should be
virtually identical for both accounting standards. According, the options’ value should be determined by an
option-pricing model and expensed in the income statement over the vesting period. This change should enable a
level playing field for all forms of compensation.
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Our dataset includes 329 companies that went public at the ‘Neuer Markt’ during the
1997 to 2002 period. Detailed stock option data was hand-collected from annual reports and
IPO offering prospectuses. This includes the starting date of the SOP, the maximal number of
stocks, beneficiaries, performance benchmarks for the exercise as well as the type and
exercise price of the o p t i o n . T h e exercise price is of special importance because it
determines the success and performance of the stock option from the perspective of the
recipient. Stock prices were provided by FactSet JCF and are adjusted for stock splits. Two
IPOs (Mobilcom and EM.TV) with extremely high initial returns (outliers) were excluded
from our analyses of stock prices. IPO information such as issuing date and offer size are
from Deutsche Borse. Ownership data for the time of the IPO was hand-collected from IPO
offering prospectuses.
In our analysis we differentiate between ‘broad-based plans’ and ‘selective plans’. A
plan is categorized as ‘broad-based’ if a significant percentage of options were dedicated to
rank and file employees. An allocation to this group is often conditioned on management
satisfaction with the professional record of the employee. The type of the option has the form
of either a naked option issued by the company or of an option embedded in a convertible
security. In our empirical analysis we exclude all convertible bond plans because of their
different incentive structure. Instead, we focus on IPOs that offered naked options to their
beneficiaries.
2. Methodology
Initial IPO returns (underpricing) are calculated by relating the first price in the secondary
market to the issuing price. The long-run performance is measured by Buy-and-Hold-Retums
(BHRs) which are calculated for a single stock as follows:
(1)

BHR i , T

nt=\(i+

-1

where Ri,t is the retum of stock i at time t, and T is the time period for which the BHR is
determined. For an equally-weighted portfolio the returns are calculated as:

(2)
■iV

where dBHRpj is the average BHR of the portfolio, N is the number of stocks in the portfolio,
and T is the time period for which the BHR is calculated. To calculate Buy-and-HoldAbnormal-Retums (BHARs), the retum of the benchmark is subtracted from the IPO retum.
The NEMAX All-Share’ index is used as a benchmark which is a market weighted
performance index that includes all companies that are listed on the ‘Neuer Markt’.
(3a)

BHAR=— y
V <=i

J

\ /=i

We are thankful to the AfU (Agentur fur Untemehmensnachrichten GmbH, Femwald) for providing the
historical reports and FactSet JCF for providing the stock price data.
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The advantage of this method is that the terminal values of the two strategies, i.e., investing in
an IPO or investing in the benchmark, are directly comparable. Thus, BHARs compare real
investment strategies over a defined period. Because some sample subgroups consist of less
than 30 observations we use the skewness adjusted t-statistics (Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999)
for testing the statistical significance of BHRs and BHARs:

(3b)

/
1
1
t = 4 n S +- f S ^ +
3
6n

.,
BHAR
, ^
, with S = ------------ , and y =
a{BHAR)

'^(BHAR. -BHAR)ncriBHARy

In order to distinguish between the motives for introducing an SOP and its volume we employ
different regression models (Model 1 to 6). For the first group of models (Model 1 to 4) we
use the ordinary least squares regression model. For Model 5 and 6 we use the binary logit
regression model because the dependent variable is binary (zero-one variable).

V. Empirical Results
Based on the empirical data for the design of stock option plans (SOPs) our analysis
focuses on three aspects. First we explore the success and performance of the stock options.
Second, we aim at identifying the relevant factors for implementing a broad-based SOP.
Third, we analyze the volume of the program. Our empirical analysis is divided into three
sections. The first section includes the descriptive statistics for the sample, the second section
analyzes the success of the SOPs and the third section the factors that influence the volume of
the SOP.
1. Descriptive Statistics
The structure of our analysis and the different subsamples are presented in Figure 1.
The data reveals a high adoption rate of SOPs at the ‘Neuer Markt’. 236 companies or 72%
adopted a stock option plan at the time of the IPO. After going public an additional 62
companies introduced an SOP. Thus, more than 90% of all IPOs enacted at least one SOP at
or subsequent to the IPO.
In the subgroup of companies with an SOP at the time of the IPO there are 29
companies that issued options only in form of convertible bonds. Within the other 207 firms
with naked options at the time of the IPO, 174 companies or 84% chose broad-based plans
with the objective of granting options to rank and file employees. Thus, the number and
design of SOPs at the ‘Neuer Markt’ appears at first relatively high and pecuUar, but this is
quite similar to the findings for new economy firms in Finland (Jones, Kalmi and Makinen,
2006). For the subgroup of companies with broad-based plans the standard two year lock-up
period was the most common form used (130 firms or 75% of all firms in this subgroup). This
two year period can be interpreted economically as being similar to the 6 months mandatory
lock-up period for management and executives as well as to the 12 months tax lock-up period
for investors who had shares allocated at the time of the IPO. Finally, we also include explicit
performance benchmarks that had to be met before the option could be exercised. The most
popular performance hurdle demanded that an absolute performance figure was met (60 out of
all broad-based naked option programs). A relative hurdle was implemented in 26 programs
and a combination of both in 16 programs.
Figure 2 presents the total number of IPOs and the number of IPOs with an SOP at the
time of the IPO as well as the performance of the Nemax All Share Index from 1997 to 2002.
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The chart reveals that stock options that were granted at the time of the IPO were popular over
the entire IPO cycle. In our empirical analysis we first analyze the entire time period and then
focus on the hot (1997-1999) and the cold issue period (2000-2002) separately.
2. Success and Wealth Effects o f SOPs
We measure the success of the SOP by employing three different measures. Each takes
the perspective of the recipients which are in most cases rank and file employees, but not
executives. Obviously, the interpretation and conclusions would most likely reverse if we
analyzed the data either from the perspective of management, the founding owners or other
shareholders.
First, we calculate the intrinsic value of the option two years subsequent to the IPO.
This is the first possible exercise date for options granted at the time of the IPO. Our sample
contains 130 companies with a broad-based SOP and a two year lock-up period. The option
value C is characterized by:
(4)

C (X,

= max (5, - X, 0).

The exercise price X is equal to the offering price and the stock price St is the market price
two years after the IPO. This approach obviously disregards the existence of additional
performance requirements such as profit and growth targets or a specific stock market
benchmark. Nevertheless, an implicit performance hurdle could be implemented by setting an
adequate and most likely higher exercise price. From the 130 firms analyzed the options of
114 firms were out of the money by the time they could be exercised (Figure 3). This is
remarkable given the fact that the benefit of a high underpricing was offered to the recipients.
For all 329 IPOs the average first-day or initial return at the ’Neuer Markt’ was 48.9% (Kurth,
2005, Bessler and Kurth, 2007). This extreme profit opportunity at the time the program was
initiated most likely convinced the participants to accept stock options as compensation
instead of cash. After two years, however, these hopes did not materialize and the expected
profitability almost disappeared. Extending the time period to four years does not change our
results qualitatively.
Next, we calculate Buy-and-Hold-Retums (BHRs) over a three year period (750
trading days) beginning with the time of the IPO (Figure 4 and Table 1). We compare two
groups: (1) firms with a broad-based SOP at the time of the IPO and a two year lock-up
period^^ and (2) firms with no SOP at the time of the IPO. For the first group we construct a
‘modified underpricing’ measure based on the exercise price of the option as the first stock
price. For the second group we use the offer price as the first price for calculating BHRs. It
therefore also includes the underpricing.
At the end of the 6 months mandatory lock-up period (after 123 trading days) the first
group of IPOs with broad-based SOPs and a two year lock-up period generated returns (BHR)
of 73% compared to the statistically significant (10% level) higher BHR of 122% for the
second group of IPOs without SOPs. Interestingly, before the expiration of the first lock-up
period the BHRs of the group with SOPs performed well and started to decrease thereafter. At
the end of the 12 months tax lock-up period (250 trading days) the BHR for the first group is
lower, but still sums up to a 52% annual return. Although the BHRs were already decreasing
Staggered plans with the first options becoming exercisable after two years are included.
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before the expiration of the second lock-up period, the BHRs start to decline noticeably just
before the expiration date. In contrast, the BHR for the second group of IPOs without SOPs
remains on a relatively high level (136%). After two years (500 trading days) the BHRs are
minus 53% and 62% for the first and the second group, respectively. This indicates that the
performance of the first group is very poor because the options are on average out of the
money. In contrast, hypothetical stock options on the companies in the second group without
SOPs were profitable after the expiration of the two year SOP lock-up period. The time period
for a profitable option exercise, i.e. the option was in the money, nearly reaches three years
(700 trading days). Because of the positively skewed return distribution, the median returns
are always lower than the mean returns, but the ranking of the returns within a group of IPOs
and between the two groups does not change.
These observed return (BHR) patterns provide some evidence that the expiration of the
first two lock-up periods was used to realize capital gains especially by the shareholders of the
first group of companies with SOPs. The founding shareholders and the management as well
as venture capital firms, which owned shares before the IPO, complied with the mandatory
lock up-period but sold their shares immediately at the expiration after 6 months (Bessler and
Kurth, 2007). It seems that the end of the first 12 months period was the beginning of an
additional share price decline. This may have been caused either by the expiration of a
voluntary extended mandatory lock-up period from 6 to 12 months or by the expiration of the
12 months tax lock-up period. This tax lock-up period should not be that important for the
founding shareholders because they invested in the firm much earlier and therefore were in a
position to sell the shares prior to the expiration of the tax lock-up period that applied to other
investors without paying the capital gains tax. In contrast, for the investor that had shares
allocated at the time of the IPO the end of the 12 months holding period is important. An early
exit or an exit as soon as possible appears to be more important for investors in this group of
IPOs, because these firms had stock options outstanding that could be exercised later on. This
may have a negative effect on earnings per share and on the share price. Obviously, these
stock options were not value enhancing for their recipients. All in all this may be interpreted
as one important factor for the overall negative performance after two years. Consequently,
stock options allocated at the time of the IPO to rank and file employees were out of the
money.
Focusing on the second group of IPOs without SOPs, it appears that for the investors
who had shares allocated at the time of the IPO, the expiration of the tax lock-up period is an
important event. In fact, these investors could have realized an average after tax annual return
of 136% by having shares allocated at the time of the IPOs. Although we cannot provide
empirical evidence due to the unavailability of data, it appears that there was no rush to sell
shares of these IPOs at the end of the first 6 months period. One reason for this result may be
that the locked-up investors expected that the share price continued to increase. Another
possible explanation is that the shares at the time of the IPOs were allocated to a specific
investor clientele for which the 12 months lock-up period was very important for tax
avoidance reasons. It seems likely that the investment bank of the IPO provided some price
support for a favorable exit to some investors, because the empirical evidence suggests that
the analysts of the underwriter issued positively biased analysts reports as well as above
average buy recommendations during the first year after the IPO (Bessler and Stanzel, 2006,
2009).
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This raises the general question about the rationale behind the granting and holding of
such options. These results also indicate that the agency problems akeady documented in
Bessler and Kurth (2007) and in Bessler and Stanzel (2009) for IPOs at the ‘Neuer Markt’
have to be extended to include the conflict of interest between rank and file employees as
option recipients and other stakeholders. It needs to be recognized, however, that the group of
IPOs that did not issue SOPs at the time of the IPO also included IPOs that granted stock
options after they went public.
In the next step we separate the sample of IPOs without SOPs at the time of the IPO
into the group of IPOs with SOPs after going public and IPOs without any SOPs at all. The
results are presented in Figure 5. The first group consists of firms that enacted a SOP later on
(‘SOP after IPO’) and the other group contains firms without any SOP at all (up to the end of
2004). The performance of the group of firms that enacted an SOP after the IPO is superior
relative to the other group of IPOs without an SOP for the entire period up to the end of the
two year lock-up period. Subsequently, there are only minor differences. Thus, it appears that
there are no substantial differences in the BHRs in the long run. However, within the first two
years after going public we find significant differences in performance, especially around the
mandatory lock-up period as well as at the end of the tax lock-up period. After 6 months the
BHRs for the two groups are 155% and 51%, respectively. Apparently, the BHRs differ
throughout the whole period. The difference begins with the higher underpricing and
continues with extremely positive BHRs for the companies that enacted SOPs later on, but
only until the expiration of the mandatory lock-up period. After 12 months the BHR are 161%
and 84% in favor of the group of IPOs that have granted stock options after going public. One
possible explanation of the later initiation of an SOP is that management as well as employees
did not expect this extremely high initial stock market performance after going public at the
‘Neuer Markt’. Attracted by the apparent profitability of stock based compensation schemes
and an overly optimistic market environment these companies initiated an SOP in response.
In addition, it appears the early and extremely positive performance of IPOs during the
new economy period and the success of SOPs at other firms may have served as a kind of
‘best practice’ motive to prevent the loss of talented employees to competing ‘new economy’
firms. After two years both groups of IPOs still have on average positive mean BHRs of 72%
and 40%. In needs to be recognized, however, that for those companies that did not enact an
SOP at the time of the IPO, the two year period is only a lower bound for the expiration of the
later SOP lock-up period. Only options initiated and granted very shortly following the IPO
may become exercisable soon after this point in time. An analysis of the median BHR,
however, reveals that the performance after two years is on average negative for the majority
of firms in both groups. The group of IPOs with SOP realized on average a return (BHR) of
minus 47% compared to the other group that has a BHR of minus 61%. At the time of the
expiration of the mandatory and the tax lock-up periods the ranking of the two groups
continues to remain the same but the median BHR are always lower compared to the mean
BHR, indicating a positively skewed return distribution.
It has been well documented in the literature that there is a significant difference in the
long-run performance of IPOs between hot and cold issue market periods (Bessler and Kurth,
2005; Bessler and Thies, 2007b). As presented in Figure 2, the ’Neuer Markt’ in Germany
was characterized by an extreme hot issue market period (1997-1999) and a devastating cold
issue market period (2000-2002). The different exit behavior of venture capitalists and other
founding shareholders at the end of the 6 months mandatory lock-up period and the tax lock-
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up period is well documented in a study by Bessler and Kurth (2007). Obviously, these
findings should apply to the two year lock-up period of SOPs in an even stronger form. It
becomes immediately evident in Figure 6 and Table 3 that the high BHRs of the overall
sample with a broad-based SOP at the time of the IPO (see Figure 4) are due to the 44 IPOs
that went public during the hot issue period. The BHRs for this group of IPOs at the end of
the mandatory lock-up period, the tax lock-up period and the option lock-up period are 186%,
201% and minus 14%, respectively. The group of IPOs in the cold issue market period just
breaks even after 6 months and has negative returns of minus 45% and minus 78% after 12
and 24 months, respectively. Nevertheless, for both groups the outlook for in-the-money stock
options after two years is on average very poor. Interestingly, both subgroups exhibit a high
underpricing of 74% and 48%, respectively. Initially, this may have been viewed as an
excellent opportunity for rank and file employees to participate in the SOP at the time of IPO.
So far we concentrated on the absolute performance (BHR) of the various groups of
IPOs. We may gain additional insights, however, by analyzing the relative performance of
these IPOs. We therefore address the question of what would have happened if a relative
performance requirement had been introduced. This performance is measured by the firm’s
stock price relative to the Nemax All Share Index. In Figure 7 and Table 4 we present the
results of our Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Retums (BHAR) analysis. Again the two subgroups
are firms with a broad-based SOP at the time of the IPO and a two year lock-up period and
firms without any SOP at the time of the IPO. As presented in Figure 7, the BHARs of the
first group of IPOs were 27%, 18% and minus 1% for the mandatory, the tax and the option
lock-up periods, respectively. The results for the other group are 32%, 32% and minus 5% for
the three periods. This indicates that the companies with SOPs were on average not able to
beat a relative performance hurdle based on the Nemax All Share Index as benchmark. It
should be noticed, however, that the two groups of IPOs were able to achieve an
outperformance after 6 months as well as after 12 months. This may indicate profitable exit
opportunities for the two other stakeholder groups of founding shareholders and wealthy
investors. Of particular interest are the drastically declining BHRs of the subsample with
SOPs after the expiration of the 12 months tax lock-up period. We interpret these as evidence
of downward price pressure caused by massive exits of early shareholders and investors.
So far we concentrated on the relative performance of the IPOs in the secondary
market. One of the major sources for the abnormal performance of IPOs, however, is the
underpricing or initial return of the IPO. We extend our analysis in that we now include the
initial returns in the calculation of the BHARs. For this we include the underpricing for the
group without SOP and a modified underpricing for the group with SOPs (Figure 8 and Table
5). This adjustment is important because for most options the exercise price was equal to the
offering price. The BHARs for the first group are 82% and 66% at the end of the 6 months
mandatory and the 12 months tax lock-up periods, respectively. This suggests that the other
two stakeholder groups who were able to exit earlier could benefit from the higher relative
performance after 6 and 12 months. As usual, the stock prices declined afterwards, even on a
relative basis. It is interesting to note, however, that in the case of stock options and a two
year lock-up period, even the higher initial returns would not ensure that the stock price
exceeded the exercise price even on a relative performance basis. The BHARs are only 13%
after 500 trading days. Thus, there was hardly any chance for the employees to benefit from
the first year’s performance of the IPO.
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For the second group an as-if-scenario with SOPs would have resulted in a different
outcome. The BHARs were 100% and 102% for the mandatory and the tax lock-up periods,
respectively. A stock-option lock-up period was not relevant because there were no stock
options at the time of the IPO.
Thus, these results confirm our previous findings that nearly all groups of IPOs have
positive BHR at the end of the 6 and 12 months periods and also outperform the market index
on a relative basis after 6 and 12 months. Thus, founding shareholders and management as
well as wealthy investors most likely all benefited from the performance of the IPOs in the
‘Neuer Markt’ over the first year after going public. As the employees were able to exercise
their stock options only after a two year lock-up period, they could not participate in the early
success of these IPOs. Instead, they experienced that most of the options were out of the
money and therefore economically worthless at the time they could eventually be exercised
for the first time.
3. Determinants o f SOP Success
We extend our analysis in this section by investigating the factors that might influence
the returns of the SOP. For this we construct regression models that use as explanatory
variables either the number of stock options in relation to the number of issued shares
excluding the Greenshoe option (SOPVOL) or a dummy variable for the presence of an SOP
at the time of the IPO (SOP). The latter takes a value of one, if the firm had an SOP at the
time of the IPO, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we use the following control variables: To
control for the home country of the IPO, we employ a dummy variable (FOR) that takes a
value of zero if the IPO is a German firm and a value of one if the IPO is headquartered in a
foreign country. To measure the degree of innovative activities of the firms we use the
number of patents that the firm applied for during the period from two years before the IPO to
two years after the IPO. Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2007, 2008) find that IPOs with patents
significantly outperformed IPOs without patents over the first two years after going public.
We use the patent data to construct a dummy variable (INOV) that takes the value of zero if
the firm has none or one patent and a value of one if the firm has more than one patent in the
period around the IPO. The idea behind this analysis is that we expect that more innovative or
new economy firms have a higher demand for highly qualified personnel and thus may be in
direct competition with established ‘old economy’ firms. This competition and the fact that
start-up technology firms should use most of their fimds for investing in growth opportunities
suggests that one reason for the introduction of a stock based compensation scheme is to offer
attractive compensation packages to their employees.
To measure the impact of corporate insider activity on performance we include three
more dummy variables: The impact of the management ownership is captured by the variable
MNG (presence of management ownership) which takes a value of zero if the percentage of
shares held by the management or the supervisory board members is below or equal to 50
percent and a value of one if this stake exceeds 50 percent. The cut-off point is chosen at this
level to account for a simple majority of voting rights. The percentage of shares owned by
One disadvantage of this measure is that in line with the patent grant the technology firm becomes less
vulnerable to employee fluctuation than before. Admittedly, the causality between compensation and innovation
could be reversed. Lemer and Wulf (2007) for example find a positive relationship between increasing long-term
incentives (e.g., stock options and restricted stock) for R&D officers and an increase in heavily cited patents
among US-firms with centralized R&D organisations.
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management after the IPO appears with a mean of 40% and a median of 41% at first glance
remarkably high. However, this observation is not surprising in light of the mandatory 6
months lock-up period for the ‘Neuer Markt’ and the tremendous underpricing of close to
50%. An exit after the expiration of the lock-up period compared to a sale at the time of the
IPO appeared much more attractive given the capital market environment at that time.
Moreover, management ownership is usually used to signal the quality of the IPO (Bessler
and Kurth, 2007). The variables VC (Venture Capital) and BANK (Banks) capture the impact
of an additional corporate governance mechanism and take a value of zero if no venture
capital company or bank is listed as a shareholder and a value of one if a venture capital
companies or a banks held equity in the firm. Finally, we use a dummy variable for the market
phase (HOT) that has the value of zero if the market can be characterized as a cold issue
market and a value of one if it can be characterized as a hot issue market.
Because the patent data used to construct INOV is restricted to registrations at the
German patent office and because there are national differences in the patenting behavior we
do not test the influence of INOV and FOR simultaneously. This results in two sets of
regression approaches for SOP\
(5)

SOP, = a+P,FOR^ + p^MNG, + p^VC, + p.BANK, + p,H O T + e, and

(6)

SOP, = a+P,INOV, + P^MNG, + P,VC, + p.BANK, + p,H O T + e, .

Respectively, the equations for SOPVOL are:
(7)

SOPVOL, = a + p^FOR, + P^MNG, + P^VC, + P.BANK, + p,H O T + £, and

(8)

SOPVOL,=a + p,INOV,+ P^MNG,+ P,VC, + P,BANK,+ p,H O T + £,.

In Equations (5) to (8) the subscript i denotes the cross-section of the data. The models that
are based on Equations (7) and (8) are tested with all available observations (Model 1 and
Model 3). We also test a reduced sample where we include only the firms with a broad-based
SOP at the time of the IPO (the sample size consists of 174 companies including foreign
companies and 151 companies excluding foreign companies). We do this in order to test for
the influence of our variables conditional on the fact that the firm decided to introduce an
SOP at the time of the IPO (Model 2 and Model 4). The results for the linear regression
models are presented in Table 6 and the results of the binary logit models are presented in
Table 7.
The dummy FOR has a positive and significant impact at the one-percent-level in
Model 1 and Model 2 while it is statistically insignificant in Model 5. Consequently, the
attribute ‘foreign IPO’ seems to positively influence the introduction of a SOP and the volume
of the program. The INOV dummy variable is insignificant in all models where this variable is
included. This is initially surprising, but could be due to the shortcomings of patent counts as
a proxy for the demand for highly qualified employees. The MNG dummy variable constantly
has a negative impact, but its influence is insignificant. Interestingly, the coefficients for the
VC and BANK dummies are positive, but only the impact of the BANK dummy is significant
in Model 1 (10% level), Model 3 (5% level) and Model 4 (10% level). This result may
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suggest some influence of these shareholders with respect to the introduction of SOPs. The
coefficient for the HOT dummy is negative in most models and significant at the 1% and 5%
levels. For the models with SOPVOL as the dependent variable this can be interpreted in two
ways. On the one hand, it could be a numerator effect and be explained by the managements’
reluctance to introduce high volumes of options (based on the affirmation of the shareholder
meeting) during market phases where it is more likely that the option is in the money at the
time of its exercise. On the other hand, it could be a denominator effect caused by a
decreasing IPO volume offered in the cold issue period. It is possible that management or
existing shareholders expected a market turnaround and an increasing option value.

VI. Conclusions
The objective of this research was to investigate the design and success of stock
option plans (SOPs) for ‘new economy’ firms that went public at the ‘Neuer Markt’ in
Germany during the period fi*om 1997 to 2002. We provide empirical evidence that SOPs
were frequently employed as a compensation scheme in these new economy firms in that
91% of all IPOs granted stock options either at the time they went public or later on.
Interestingly, we observe a broad-based granting intention including employees rather than
executives as the primary beneficiaries of the stock options. This observation for ‘new
economy’ firms is in sharp contrast to the usual practice at established firms and requires a
different explanation. In line with previous research (e.g., Bergman and Jenter, 2007), our
empirical results suggest that the prediction of the upside potential of the stock price and the
option value was too optimistic at the time the stock option plans were initiated. Because the
‘Neuer Markt’ was characterized by an immense stock price increase during the period fi*om
1998 to 2000 (hot issue market) followed by a sharp stock price decline that started in March
2000 (cold issue market), almost all of the options were out of the money at the time they
eventually could be exercised.
When searching for explanations for these empirical results it is important to do this
in the context of the German legal environment. We find that the design of these stock
options suffers from an unfavorable succession of lock-up periods rendering a profitable
option exercise for the rank and file employee as very difficult. The regulations of the ‘Neuer
Markt’ required a lock-up period of at least two years for stock options for German firms.
Moreover, there were two other lock-up periods that usually expired before the two year
stock option lock-up period. This was first the mandatory lock-up period of 6 months that
applied to the founding shareholders of the IPO and second the tax lock-up period of 12
months that applied especially to the private more wealthy shareholders that had shares
allocated at the time of the IPO. The end of the SOP lock-up period was 12 months later or
overall after 24 months. Thus, the threat of stock price dilution by stock options was
relatively distant for the other two groups but it was rational to exit before a stock option
exercise was possible. Thus, the option holder had to settle for what was left after the
downward price pressure caused by the exit of other shareholders and the burst of the ‘new
economy stock market bubble. As the option exercise is only profitable if the stock price
exceeds the exercise price, option holders were left with no profits. Another possible
explanation is that the IPOs just followed the ‘fashion’ common among ‘new economy’ firms
to implement an SOP. From an employee’s point of view the tremendous underpricing
promised a high profitability of stock options at the time of the IPO. However, the expected
profits did never materialize.
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Figure 1
Sample Split-up
All 329 IPOs were split up into subgroups by differentiating the time of SOP introduction, the options’
recipients, the lock-up period and the market sentiment (hot and cold issue markets). The bold framed boxes
indicate the subgroups we analyzed later using buy-and-hold returns. SOPs using only convertible bonds at IPO
were excluded from further analysis because of their different incentive effect. The subgroup “Broad-based plan”
may include additional selective plans. The subgroup “Naked options at IPO” may include additional convertible
plans. Two firms, namely Mobilcom and EM.TV, were treated as outliers because of their immense stock
performance and were not analyzed.
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Figure 2
Nemax All Share Index, the Total Number of IPOs and the Number of IPOs with
SOP at IPO Date
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Figure 3
The Options’ Value after Two Years
To calculate the options’ value after two years the options’ exercise price was set equal to the issuing price. The
sample includes 130 IPOs.
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Figure 4
IPOs with SOP and without SOP at Time of IPO

The BHRs are calculated for firms with broad-based naked option SOPs at IPO and a two year lock-up period or
a staggered lock-up period beginning with two years (’’Broad-based SOP with 2Y lock-up”). The comparison
group are firms with no SOP at IPO (”no SOP at IPO”, may have designed an SOP later). The first price of the
firms with an SOP is determined by the options’ exercise price as described by the plan (usually the exercise
price was set equal to the issuing price). For the group without an SOP the first price equals the issuing price
(BHR includes underpricing).
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Figure 5
IPOs with SOPs after IPO and no SOPs
The subset of firms with no SOP at IPO in Figure 4 (N=91) is divided into two further subgroups. ”SOP after
IPO” represent the firms that introduced an SOP later on and ‘no SOP’ represents the firms never designed an
SOP (the period under observation starts with the IPO and ends in 2004). For both groups the first price equals
the issuing price (BHR includes underpricing).
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Figure 6
Hot and Cold Issue Market

The subset of firms with broad-based naked option SOPs at IPO with a two year lock-up period in Figure 4
(N=130) is divided into two subgroups distinguishing between firms that went public in the hot issue market
(IPO before January 1, 2000) (’’Broad-based SOP with 2Y lock-up hot issue”) and firms that went public in the
cold issue market (IPO after December 31, 1999) (’’Broad-based SOP with 2Y lock-up cold issue”).
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Figure 7
BHARs for “no SOP at IPO” and “Broad-based SOP
with 2Y lock-up” excluding Underpricing
The BHARs (excluding underpricing) are calculated for firms with broad-based naked option SOPs at IPO and a
two year lock-up period or a staggered lock-up period beginning with two years (’’Broad-based SOP with 2Y
lock-up”). The comparison group are firms with “no SOP at IPO” (may have designed an SOP later). The
Nemax All Share Index is used as the market index.
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Figure 8
BHARs for “no SOP at IPO” and “Broad-based SOP
with 2Y lock-up” including Underpricing

The BHARs (including underpricing) are calculated for firms with broad-based naked option SOPs at IPO and a
two year lock-up period or a staggered lock-up period beginning with two years (’’Broad-based SOP with 2Y
lock-up”). The comparison group are firms with no SOP at IPO (”no SOP at IPO , may have designed an SOP
later). The Nemax All Share Index is used as the market index.
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Table 1
IPOs with and without an SOP at Time of IPO
BB_S0P_IP0_2Y and NO SOP IPO are IPOs with a broad-based SOP at IPO with a two year lock-up
requirement and IPOs with no SOP at IPO, respectively. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard deviation,
t (adj.) and t (Means) the t-values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences of means,
respectively. ***,*♦, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

N

Mean Median

STD

t(adi.)

t (Means)

BHR123
BB_SOP_JPO_ 2Y
No SOP IPO

130

73.33% 24.86%

164.98% 7.06 * * *

91

121.76% 52.92%

205.86% 8.02 * * *

-1.94 *

BHR250
BB__SOP_JPO__2Y
No SOP IPO

130

51.63% -32.27%

91

136.29% 59.17%

130

-52.76% -81.11%

91

61.89% -49.22%

243.68% 3.36 * * *
225.06% 7.64

-2.62 * * ♦

BHR 500
BB_SOP__IPO__2Y
No SOP IPO

108.34% 1.37
285.91% 2.59 * * *

-4.17 * ♦ *
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Table 2
IPOs with SOPs after IPO and no SOPs
AFTERJPO and NO_IPO are IPOs with a SOP after the IPO and no SOP, respectively. N denotes the sample
size, STD the standard deviation, t (adj.) and t (Means) the t-values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test
for differences of means, respectively. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

N

Mean

STD

t(ad j.)

78.99%

229.98%

7.51 * * *

20.50%

115.50%

3.10 * * *

Median

t (Means)

BHR123
AfterJPO
No SOP

62
29

154.95%
50.80%

2.30 **

BHR250
AfterJPO

62

160.74%

66.55%

234.77%

7.04 * * *

No SOP

29

84.00%

52.31%

196.41%

3.21 * * *

AfterJPO

62

72.10%

-46.66%

295.04%

2.45 ♦ *

No SOP

29

40.05%

-60.75%

269.04%

1.08

1.53

BHR500
0.50

Table 3
Hot and Cold Issue Market
HOT and COLD are IPOs with a broad-based SOP at IPO with a two year lock-up requirement and an IPO date
before January 1, 2000 and after December 31, 1999, respectively. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard
deviation, t (adj.) and t (Means) the t-values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences of means,
respectively. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

N

Mean

Median

STD

HOT

51

185.95%

129.20%

201.10%

10.76

COLD

79

0.62%

-16.67%

73.77%

0.11

t{adj.)

t (Means)

BHR123
7 .4 6 ***

BHR250
HOT

51

200.96%

95.06%

332.24%

7.80

COLD

79

-44.78%

-52.65%

58.79%

-0.82

HOT

51

-13.67%

-68.76%

164.48%

-0.40

COLD

79

-77.99%

-85.13%

20.64%

6.43 * * *

BHR500
35.03 * ♦ *

3 44 * * *
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Table 4
BHARs for “no SOP at IPO” and ‘‘Broad-based SOP
with 2Y lock-up” excluding Underpricing
BHR_BB_S0P_IP0_2Y and BHR NO SOP IPO are IPOs with a broad-based SOP at IPO with a two year
lock-up requirement and IPOs with no SOP at IPO, respectively. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard
deviation, t (adj.) and t (Means) the t-values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences of means,
respectively. ***,*♦, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

N

Mean

Median

STD

t(adj.)

t (Means)

BHAR 123
BB_S0P_IP0_2Y
No SOP IPO

130

26.75%

0.66%

95.95%

91

32.19%

-5.54%

123.08%

4.04
3.21 ** *

-0.37

BHAR 250
BB_S0P_IP0_2Y
No SOP IPO

130

18.07%

-5.57%

148.81%

1.76 *

91

31.94%

-4.45%

156.82%

2.23 **

130

-1.20%

-6.38%

65.73%

-0.13

91

-5.40%

-12.21%

152.55%

-0.33

-0.67

BHAR 500
BB_S0P_IP0_2Y
No SOP IPO

0.28

Table 5
BHARs for “no SOP at IPO” and “Broad-based SOP
with 2Y lock-up” including Underpricing
BHR_BB_S0P_IP0_2Y and BHR NO SOP IPO are IPOs with a broad-based SOP at IPO with a two year
lock-up requirement and IPOs with no SOP at IPO, respectively. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard
deviation, t (adj.) and t (Means) the t-values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences of means,
respectively. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

N

Mean

Median

STD

t(adj.)

135.83%

10.72 ** *
7.74 * * ♦

t (Means)

BHAR 123
BB_S0PJP0_2Y
No SOP IPO

130

81.57%

44.89%
46.37%

91

99.91%

BB_S0P_IP0_2Y
No SOP IPO

130

66.23%

91

101.81%

12.43%
20.86%

130

13.45%

BHAR 500
-1.48%

91

50.81%

-7.51%

172.57%

-0.88

BHAR 250

BB_S0P_IP0_2Y
No SOP IPO

204.04%
209.44%
86.89%
247.24%

5.95 * * ♦
5.96 * * ♦
2.50 **
2.35 **

-1.26

-1.59
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Table 6
Linear Regression Models
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Variable
FOR

Model 2

Model 1
0.1351 * * ♦

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0044

0.0126

0.2503 ♦ * *

INOV
MNG

-0.0283

-0.0235

-0.0090

-0.0132

VC

0.0217

0.0266

0.0282

0.0349

0.0569 *

0.0622

0.0638 **

0.0605 *

0.0259

-0.0477 **

BANK
HOT

-0.0704 * * *

Const.

0.1681 * * *

0.2281 * * *

0.1455 * * *

0.2030 ***

Obs.

329

174

286

151

Adj.R2

0.0821

0.1467

0.0340

0.0444

Prob(F-stat)

0.0000

0.0000

0.0117

0.0403

0.0661

Table 7
ML Binary Logit Models
and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Variable

Model 5

FOR

0.0202

INOV

Model 6

-0.1442

MNG

-0.1661

-0.0567

VC

0.1144

0.1218

BANK

0.3794

0.5010

HOT

-1.3134

Const.

0.8511 * * *

-1.3965 * * *
0.8652 * * *

Obs.

329

McFadden R2

0.0821

0.0797

Prob(LP stat.)

0.0000

0.0000

286

